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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SUNDAY SEARCH WARRANTS
By
HOMER L. KREMER*
May a search warrant be served on Sunday to seize gambling devices operated behind closed doors in a club, where there is no open or visible disturbance
of the neighborhood or any apparent act tending to disturb the public peace?
This question came before the Dauphin County Court recently in Commonwealth v. Magaro, 64 Dauphin 63 (Nov. 3, 1952), on the defendant's petition
to quash a search warrant and suppress the evidence obtained thereunder on the
ground that the warrant was void because it was served on Sunday, contrary to Section 4 of the Act of 1705, I Smith Laws 25 (44 Purdon's Penna. Statutes, Section
(1) which provides:
"No person or persons, upon the first day of the week, shall serve
or execute, or cause to be served or executed, any writ, precept, warrant,
order, judgment or decree, except in case of treason, felony or breach
of the peace; but the serving of any such writ, precept, warrant, order,
judgment or decree shall be void, to all intents and purposes whatsoever;
and the person or persons so serving or executing the same, shall be as
liable to the suit of the party grieved, and to answer damages to him for
doing thereof, as if he or they had done the same without any writ, precept, warrant or order, judgment or decree at all." (Emphasis supplied.)
The defendant contended that the execution of the search warrant on Sunday was illegal and void because it did not come within the exceptions set out in
the Act of 1705. These exceptions are (1) treason, (2) felony, and (3) breach
of the peace.
The principal question for decision was whether the setting up and operating of slot machines and a punch board for gambling purposes behind closed
doors constitutes a "breach of the peace" where there is no open or visible disturbance of the neighborhood or any act tending to disturb the public peace, quiet
and tranquility outside of the premises.
To construe the phrase "breach of the peace" in the Pennsylvania Act of
1705 it is necessary to revert to its parent Act, which is the English statute entitled "The Sunday Observance Act of 1667." (29 Charles II, Chapter 7, Section
(6) Section 6 of that act is as follows:
"Provided alsoe that noe person or persons upon the Lord's Day
shall serve or execute or cause to be served or executed any writt, processe, warrant, order, judgment or decree (except in cases of treason,
felony, or breach of the peace) but that the service of every such writt,
*Member of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania; A.B. and A.M.,
Dickinson College; LL.B., Dickinson School of Law.
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processe, warrant, order, judgment or decree shall be void to all intents
and purposes whatsoever and the person or persons soe serveing or executing the same shall be as lyable to the suite of the parties grieved and
to answer damages to him for doeing thereof as if he or they had done the
same without any writt, processe, warrant, order, judgment or decree at
all." (Emphasis supplied.)
This is practically the identical language of our Pennsylvania Act of 1705.
The purpose behind the English statute is illustrated by the Preamble to the
Act of 1667, the act being passed "for the better observance of the Lord's Day,
commonly called Sunday." That Pennsylvania had the same motive is clearly seen
from the case of Johnson v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. 102, 111 (1853), where the
court, after quoting Blackstone on the observance of Sunday, said:
"It is apparent from these authorities, as well as from the whole
history of the instituted Sabbath, and particularly from the preamble
to our old Act of 1705 .... that rest and the public worship of Almighty
God were the primary objects of the institution, both as a divine and
civil appointment; and it seems to me to follow, as a necessary consequence that no means reasonably necessary to these ends can be regarded
as prohibited."
Several of the early Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases point out that our
Act of 1705 was based on this English statute. Omit v. Commonwealth, 21 Pa.
426 (1853). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that when the words "breach
of the peace" were used in Pennsylvania's statute, they were to be given the same
meaning as in the English statute of 1667. There was no restriction at common
law against the serving of process on the Sabbath. Since Pennsylvania, from the
time of its beginning, has retained much of the common law, it can be equally
asserted that the intent behind the Act of 1705 was to give it the same effect
as the parent statute.
On April 22, 1794 an Act of Assembly now commonly known as the "Blue
Law" was enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature, and re-enacted into the Penal
Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, 18 P. S. 4699.4. Its object was the imposition of penalties to compel the observance of Sunday. For example, in Commonwealth v. Waldman, 140 Pa. 89 (1891) a fine of $4.00 was imposed for operating a barber shop on Sunday.
The English Sunday Observance Act of 1667, supra, has been interpreted
to mean that the exception, that process may be executed on the Lord's Day in
cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace extends to all indictable offenses,
and is not restricted to treason and felony, and such misdemeanors as involve an
actual breach of the peace.
In Rawlins v. Ellis and Others, 153 English Reports (Reprints) 1147 (1846),
16 M. & W. 172; 16 L.J. Ex. 5; 10 Jur. 1039, the plaintiff brought an action for
assault and false imprisonment against the defendants who were police-inspec-
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tors and had arrested him on Sunday for unlawfully conspiring to deprive another
of the peaceable possession of a certain house. In giving judgment for the defendants the court held that:
"The meaning of the statute is that it authorizes the arrest on a Sunday of all persons who have been guilty of an indictable offense."
In Sir Cecil against Others of the Town of Nottingham, 88 English Reports
(Reprints) 1371, 12 Mod. 348 (1700), the question was, whether serving an
attachment for contempt on Sunday was within Section 6 of the Statute-29 Charles II, Chapter 7, Section 6, supra. The court held that the attachment could be
served on Sunday, saying:
"Suppose it were a warrant to take for forgery, perjury, &c. shall
it not be served on Sunday? And shall not any process at the King's suit
be served on Sunday? Surely the Lord's Day ought not to be a sanctuary
for malefactors."
The views of various learned authors on the meaning of the phrase, "breach
of the peace" in connection with the privileges of members of Parliament are set
forth by Mr. Justice White in Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425 at pages
438,446 (1908). The works of Lord Mansfield, Blackstone, Hatsell, May, Storey,
311d Cushing are cited for the proposition that the privilege of members of Parliament, except for treason, felony or breach of the peace, referred only to freedom
from arrest in civil cases, as in actions for debt, and that the privilege does not
extend to any indictable offense.
May, in his treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usages of Parliament, first published in 1844 (Tenth Edition at page 112), cited in Williamson
v. United States, 207 U. S. 425, at 441 (1908), states:
"The privilege of freedom from arrest has always been limited to
civil causes, and has not been allowed to interfere with the administration
of criminal justice. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
Blackstone, in 1765, discussing the subject of privileges of Parliament, says:
"Neither can any member of either house be arrested and taken
into custody, unless for some indictable offense, without a breach of the
privilege of Parliament."
"It is to be observed that there is no precedent of any such writ of
privilege, but only in civil suits; and that the statute of 1 Jac. I, c. 13,
and that of King William (which remedy some conveniences arising
from privilege of Parliament), speak only of civil actions. And therefore
the claim of privilege hath been usually guarded with an exception as to
the case of indictable'crimes;or, as it has been frequently expressed, of
treason, felony and breach (or surety) of the peace. Whereby it seems
to have been understood that no privilege was allowable to the members, their families or servants, in any crime whatsoever, for all crimes
are treated by the law as being contra pacem domini regis." (Emphasis
supplied.)
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Blackstone Commentaries, Book 1, p. 165, 166; Ltwis' Edition, Volume 1,
pages 153, 154.
The phrase "breach of the peace" appears in the American Articles o Confederation of 1777 in Article V:
"Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached
or questioned in any court, or place out of Congress, and the members of
Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests, and imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and attendance on
Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.
and in Article I, Section 6, Clause 1 of the Constitutionof the United States (1787):
"The Senators and Representatives .... shall in all cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during
their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going
to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."
In Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425 (1908), a member of Congress
had been convicted of conspiring to commit the crime of subornation of perjury
in proceedings for the purchase of public land. He protested against the court
passing sentence upon him on the ground that thereby he would be deprived of
his constitutional right to go to, attend at and return from the ensuing session
of Congress. His objection being overruled, the defendant, after sentence, contending that because the offense in question was admittedly neither treason or
felony, it was likewise not embraced within the words "breach of the peace" as
found in the constitutional exception, because the phrase, "breach of the peace"
means only actual breaches of the peace, offenses involving violence or public
disturbance. In Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425,446 (1908), the Supreme Court, in an exhaustive review of the parliamentary privilege in England,
showed the source from which the expression "treason, felony and breach of the
peace" was drawn and held that:
"Since from the foregoing it follows that the terms treason, felony
and breach of the peace, as used in the constitutional provision relied
upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses,
the conclusion results that thL claim of privilege of exemption from arrest and sentence was without merit, ....
In Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 83 (1934), Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking
for the Supreme Court, reaffirmed the doctrine of the Williamson case, stating at
page 83 that:
"When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil suits were still
common in America. It is only to such arrests that the provision applies.
Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425."
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In this case Ansell brought an action for libel by serving a summons on United
States Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana, who claimed that while in attendance
at sessions of the Senate within the District of Columbia, he was immune in
civil cases not only from arrest, but also from service of process. The Supreme
Court held that the immunity privilege is limited only to exemption from arrest
in civil suits. Justice Brandeis cited, inter alia, Troubat & Haly, Practice in Civil
Actions and Proceedings in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (1837), pages
170-189, and United States v. Cooper (C.C.), 4 Dallas 341, 1 L. Ed. 859 (1800),
which held that a member of Congress is not exempt from the service of a subpoena
in a criminal case.
In the Pennsylvania Constitutionsof 1790, 1833 and 1873, the phrase "treason, felony or breach of the peace," appears in almost identical form. Article II,
Section 15 of the PennsylvaniaConstitution of 1873 provides:
"The members of the General Assembly shall in all cases, except
treason, felony, violation of their oath of office, and breach or surety
of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of their respective Houses and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any speech or debate in either House they shall not be
questioned in any other place." (Emphasis supplied.)
This section was interpreted shortly after its adoption by President Judge
Clayton of Delaware County in Commonwealth ex rel. 0. Flagg Bullard v. The
Keeper of the fail, 1 Del. Co. 215; 4 W. N.C. 540 (1877). The relator Bullard
was a member of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania. He was arrested
eight days before the commencement of the session charged with embezzlement.
He claimed the right to be released on the ground of privilege, alleging he was
on his way from Media to the State Capitol at Harrisburg at the time of his arrest. The court refused to discharge the relator, holding that the phrase "breach of
the peace" including all indictable misdemeanors, and quoted Blackstone's definition: (1 Bl. Com. 167)
"The words 'breach of the peace' include all indictable misdemeanors, for all crimes are treated by law as being contra pacem domini regis.
And instances have not been wanting where privileged persons have been
convicted of misdemeanors, and committed, or prosecuted to outlawry,
even in the middle of a session, which proceeding has afterwards received the sanction and approbation of Parliament.'
In answering the argument that the phrase was restricted to actual breaches
of the public peace, such as quarrels, riots, assaults, batteries and public disturbances, President Judge Clayton said:
"But here again the reason of the law points out the absurdity of
the argument. Can it be possible that the people of the state, through their
representatives in the Convention of 1873, intended to protect the members of the Legislature from arrest for forgery, bribery, perjury and such
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enormous. crimes (being misdemeanors, and not actual breaches of the
peace), and at the same time suffer them to be apprehended even in the
Ca ital for singing and boisterous song in the streets at midnight." (4
W.N.C. 541)
The Committee on Judiciary General of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives of the General Assembly investigated the Bullard case and in a report
to the House on January 29, 1878, reported, inter alia: (Page 232)
"We are therefore of opinion that the words 'breach or surety of
the peace' in the fifteenth section of the second article of our Constitution
are used in the same sense, and must receive the same construction as
that given to a similar clause in the Federal Constitution, and to the same
words as they are used in limiting the personal privileges of members of
the English Parliament, and that against an indictable offence privilege
cannot be pleaded ....
The fact that the offences charged are criminal in
their nature is an end of the matter with us .....
In an opinion by William M. Rutter, Deputy Attorney General for the
Pennsylvania Department of Justice to Lynn G. Adams, Commissioner, Pennsylvania State Police, reported in 37 D. & C. 649 (1940), it was held that the
members of the General Assembly have no privilege from arrest on sight, or from
service of summons for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code. The opinion cited
the Delaware County case of Commonwealth ex rel. 0. Flagg Bullard v. The
Keeper of the Jail, supra, and Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425 (1908)
to the same effect and noted that in the early days arrest, as for debt, was a common incident of civil process but it no longer is, that therefore the reasons for
protecting members of legislative bodies from the service of summons in civil
matters no longer obtain and that "no one, then or now, should be exempt from
criminal process." See also "Privilege from Arrest" in 4 Am.Jur. (1936) Section
95, at page 65.
There do not appear to be any appellate court decisions in this Commonwealth which have directly interpreted the phrase "breach of the peace" as it is
contained in the Act of 1705. There are a number of lower court cases but their
results are not uniform. There has been some confusion injected into the judicial
reasoning in interpreting the Act of 1705 with that of the Sunday Laws beginning with the Act of 1794, supra, which provides that:
"Whoever does or performs any worldly employment or business
whatsoever on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday (work of necessity and charity only excepted),. .shall, upon conviction thereof in a
summary proceeding, be sentenced to pay a fine.,.."
Many of the early decisions deal with activities that were illegal only when
committed on the Sabbath, such as playing baseball, selling newspapers, operating barber shops, shipyards and other business establishments.
The defendant in the Magaro case, supra, relied upon three decisions of the
Dauphin County Court in support of his contention that the setting up of gamb-
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ling devices known as slot machines, does not constitute a breach of the peace so
long as the public on the outside of the premises is not disturbed by their operation. He cited Commonwealth v. Fannasy 44 Dauphin Co. 301 (Oct. 23, 1937);
Commonwealth v. Russel, 52 Dauphin Co. 303 (Mar. 23, 1942) and Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 53 Dauphin Co. 105 (July 13, 1942). Those cases were decided before any of the present members of that court became members thereof.
The opinion in each was written by an eminent jurist, the late President Judge
William M. Hargest.
In the Fannasy case the defendant was indicted for keeping a gaming house.
He was charged with setting up slot machines on the second floor of the building known as 307 Market Street in the City of Harrisburg. Promptly after the
indictment was found he filed a petition to quash it on the ground that the search
warrant was served on a Sunday, in violation of the Act of 1705. The court quashed
the indictment and, in construing "breach of the peace," stated at page 303:
"There must be some violation of public order, disturbance of
public tranquility, some act of conduct inciting to violence or tending to
provoke or incite others to break the peace. 'Breaches of the peace generally manifest themselves by some outward, visible, audible or violent
demonstration; not from quiet, orderly, and peaceable acts secretly done,
though such acts may be mala prohibita'. 8 R.C.L. 285, Sec. 306.
"So it has been held that while the mre carrying about and selling
newspapers on Sunday would not amount to a breach of the peace, yet
the crying of newspapers in the public streets on Sunday would. Com.
v. Teamann, I Phila. 167. The selling and giving away of liquor
without a license on Sunday in one's own house is not a breach of the
peace. Com. v. DePuyter, 16 Pa. C.C. 589.
"In Commonwealth v. Orlick, 28 D. & C. 213, it is held that the
passing of a traffic light in a borough, by a motorist, is not a breach of
the peace."
Judge Hargest cited one other case on which he relied strongly,-the decision
of Judge Lewis of Philadelphia County in Commonwealth v. Sherman et al., 14 D
& C. 4 (1930), to the effect that the term "breach of the peace" does not include
everything that "disorderly conduct" includes. In the Sherman case at the instance
of the Director of Public Safety of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia police afrested
on Sunday, August 3, 1930, the managers of two contesting semi-professional
baseball teams and the umpire for engaging in a baseball game and charged them
with disorderly conduct under the Act of May 2, 1901, P. L. 132, Section 1, 18
P. S. 4406. The court held that the evidence did not establish disorderly conduct
amounting to a breach of the peace and that therefore the arrest of the defendants
on Sunday without a warrant was unlawful and the whole proceeding was void.
In the course of the opinion in the Sherman case the court discussed the Act
of 1705 and what constituted a breach of the peace. It will be noted that the entire discussion was dicta since no warrant had actually been issued. The court con-
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cluded that a breach of the peace required some disturbance of the public tranquility by an outward, audible, violent demonstration. However, a careful reading of
this case discloses, we believe, that judge Lewis meant to limit this to situations
where the defendant's conduct was only called into question because it was done on
Sunday. This becomes evident from an analysis of the cases cited by the court.
Commonwealth v. Foster, 28 Pa. Super. 400 (1905) is cited as authority for the
proposition that our highest courts have rejected the view that all violations of
the law are breaches of the peace. Yet this decision concerned the doing of worldly
employment on Sunday and in it the court said:
"This record contains nothing from which it could be inferred that
there was any reasonable ground to apprehend or that this justice of the
peace apprehended, that this defendant would commit any felony or
misdemeanor or disturb the peace.
Commonwealth v. Eyre, 1 S. & R. 347 (1815), dealt with persons working in a shipyard on Sunday and held that the mere doing of work without noise
or disorder was not an actual breach of the peace Commonwealth v. Teaman, 1
Phila. 460 (1853), (involving sale of newspapers on Sunday) was to the same
effect. Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa. 511 (1920) and Commonwealth v.
Smith, 43 Pa. C. C. Reps. 93 (Potter Co., 1914), both dealt with playing of outdoor games on Sunday.
Nowhere in his opinion does Judge Lewis in the Sherman case, supra, discuss
a situation which involves the arrest on Sunday of one who was committing a
criminal act against which the public policy of this Commonwealth is firmly set.
In fact, he states at page 14:
"It is not to be assumed that the Act of 1705 having for its purpose
the restriction of judicial and police activities on Sunday to the most serious and necessary cases in order that interference with the day of rest
should be reduced to a minimum, may be construed to widen policq authority by authorizing the arrest without a warrant on that day of persons
-who could not be lawfully thus arrested on any other day of the week."
(Italics supplied.)
The entire opinion in the Sherman case is built around an attempt to reconcile the Act of 1794 prohibiting all worldly pursuits on Sunday except those of
charity and necessity, with modern conditions and attitudes. judge Lewis' basic
premise is that Sunday is both a day of rest and a day set aside for the worship
of Almighty God, and that anything reasonably necessary for tese ends should
not be prohibited. It is with this in mind that he interprets the phrase "breach
of the peace" in the Act of 1705.
The possession, maintenance and opleration of slot machines for gambling
purposes is emphatically against the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
As was aptly stated by the Berks County Court in Commonwealth . Feather, 41
Berks Co. L.J. 35, at 36 (1948) (Mays, P. J., Shanaman, Hess, J.J.):
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"As we view it, the slot machines which were seized are gambling
devices, per se, and, not being usable for any lawful purpose, their fate

is sealed. Under the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as to
gambling devices, thty become 'contraband' or 'outlaw' property.
"This public policy is outlined in statutory enactment, as well as in
judicial decision, by a provision of the new Criminal Code, approved
June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, Section 603, 18 P. S. 4603.
"'Whoever maintains any gambling device or apparatus, to win or
gain money or other property of'value. .is guilty of a misdemeanor.'
"Section 604 of the Code, supra, 18 P. S.4604,
'Whoever makes, manufactures or assembles any... slot machines,
or any machine or device used or intended to be used for gambling, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.'
"Section 605 of the Code, supra, 18 P. S. 4605,
"Whoever sets up or establishes or causes to be set up or established
any game or device of address or hazard at which money or other valuable
thing may be or shall be played for, or staked or betted upon, is guilty of a
mis Temeanor.'
"Section 612 of the Code, supra, 18 P. S.4612,
'Whoever keeps or exhibits any gaming table device or apparatus to
win or gain money or other property of value.., is guilty of nuisance.'"
President Judge Dumbauld stated in Commonwealth ex rel. v. Twenty-five
Slot Machines, 88 Pittsburgh L.J. 465, 467 (1940):
"It will thus be seen that the slot machine is completely debarred
from any place in the lawful activities of any resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."
See also Plotnick v. Penna. P.U.C. 143 Pa. Super. 550, at 552 (1940), Keller,
P.J.; slot machines are gambling -machines per se, Commonwealth v. Cancillieri,
166 Pa. Super. 1 (1950),' and are subject to seizure, forfeiture and destruction,
Petition of Newcomb, 49 Lackawanna Jur. 77, Hoban, J. (1947).
The second Dauphin County case cited by the defendant in the Magaro case
was Commonwealth v. Russel et al. 52 Dauphin Co. 303 (March 23, 1942). The
defendant was charged with the illegal sale of beer on Sunday. This case also came
before the court upon a motion of quash the indictment, on the ground that the
search warrant on which it was based was void because it was served on Sunday,
contrary to Section 4 of the Act of 1705. The defendant contended that the offense charged was not a breach of the peace.
1 In the Harrisburg Patriot of Saturday, October 4, 1952 it is reported that on the preceding day the
Attorney General of Pennsylvania caused to be executed a synchronized raid in four counties at more
than 100 clubs and other establishments in which more than 600 slot machines, valued in excess
of $300,000 were seized. Mass raids were also conducted by the state police under the direction of
the Attorney General in the winter of 1951 and early in the year 1952 in four counties, in which
a total of about 700 machines were seized.
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Judge Hargest indicated he did not agree with the &dcisionin Commonwealth
v. Wingel, 54 Montg. 122 (1938); 32 D. & C. 75, Dannehower, J. to the

effect that the sale of intoxicating liquor to non-members of a club amounted to a
bhreach of the peace, and that the Act of 1705 did not apply. Nevertheless, he ruled
that it was not necessary for the court to rest its decision upon a construction of the
words breach of the peace because the motion to quash the indictment in the Russel
case, based upon evidence obtained under an alleged void search warrant, came too
late and that the defendant having given bail for court could not after indictment
2
further raise any question touching the legality of his arrest. (The same situation
existed in the Fannasy case but was not considered by the court.)

The third Dauphin County case relied upon by the defendant in the Magaro
cas'e was Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 53 Dauphin Co. 105, decided by Judge
Hargest July 13, 1942. In this case a search warrant was executed on- Sunday. The
premises searched on that day consisted of a room in the rear of a storeroom at
1256 Market Street in the City of Harrisburg. A "crap" game was in progress at
the time the search warrant was served. It was stipulated that "there was no noise
audible to any one outside the closed door of thc room where the said gambling
devices were seized." The court reaffirmed its conclusions in the Fannasy and
Russel cases, stating that the words "breach of the peace" mean a breach of the
public peace, and again cited the opinion of Judge Lewis in Commonwealth v. Sherman, 14 D. and C. 4, supra, from which Judge Hargest concluded that the facts
in the McQuaid case did not come within the term "breach of the peace," citing
the definition of this phrase in 8 R.C.L. 285, Sec. 306, which he had quoted in the
Fannasy case in 1937.
In Comonwealth v. Dakich, 28 Dauphin Co. 142, 145 (1924), 6 D. and
C. 444, (a case which apparently was not brought to judge Hargest's attention when
he wrove the opinions in the Fannasy, Russel and McQuaid cases, supra), the late
Judge Fox interpreted the phrase "breaeh of the peace" in the Act of 1705. In that
case the police of Steelton arrested the defendant at 2 o'clock on a Sunday morning
while he was asleep in an automobile which was standing in a street with no lights
in operation upon it. The officers saw this, walked over to the defendant and
asked to see his license cards. Thereupon they smelled the odor of alcoholic liquor
emanating from the automobile. Whereupon they made a search of it and found
13 cans of intoxicating liquor in the vehicle. The arresting officers took the defendant into custody and his defense was that such arrest was in violation of the Act of
2 Citing, inter alia: Commonwealth v. Dingman, 26 Pa. Super. 615 (1904); Commonwealth v.
Keegan, 70 Pa. Super. 436 (1918); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 193 Pa. 567 (1899).
It is also important to note that "the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Dabbierio 290 Pa. 174 (1927) held that admission of evidence gained by an illegal search was not a
denial of the privilege against self-incrimination. Since that time Pennsylvania courts have admitted such evidence." Commonwealth v. Gross, 125 Pa. Super. 373 (1937); Commonwealth v.
Colpo, 98 Pa. Super. 460 (1930). See "Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest" by
Paula R. Markowitz and Walter I. Summerfield, Jr., Vol. 100, University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, page 1212, June 1952.
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1705. The arresting officers had no process. Under the common law an officer, to
make an arrest without a warrant, had to show that the offense was a felony, or a
breach of the peace. It, therefore, became necessary to detern-mine whether or
not the defendant's conduct on this occasion amounted to a breach of the peace.
Judge Fox held that the defense was not well grounded and he gave in his opinion
the almost universally used definition of breach of the peace, in the following
language:
"The term, 'breach of the peace,' is generic and includes all violations of public peace or order or acts tending to the disturbance thereof."
5 Cyc. 1024.
"Breaches of the peace generally manifest themselves by some outward, visible, audible, or violent demonstration, not from quiet, orderly
and peaceable acts secretly done, though such acts may be mala prohibita."
8 R. C. L. page 285. (Page 446.)
Judge Fox, in discharging the rule granted on the defendant's petition to show
cause why the evidence should not be suppressed, held:
"We think that it is a breach of the peace to have an automobile
standing, as this one is alleged to have b'een, on the public highwa at two
o'clock in the morning without any lights operating on it and filled with
thirteen cans of intoxicating liquor. It is a violation of peace or order because it tends to the disturbance of peace or order, although it be not
a violent demonstration.'' (Italics supplied.) (Page 446).
Although Judge Hargest apparently concluded in Commonwealth v. Russel,
supra, that selling liquor without a license on Sunday was not a breach of the
peace, Judge Dannehower of the Montgomery County Court in Commonwealth v.
WVingel, et al., 32 D. & C. 75 (1938), took the opposite view in a well reasoned
opinion, saying at page 79:
"Otherwise, a hotel liquor licensee could sell liquor all day Sunday
without fear of being arrested on that day. He could then disappear during
the week and return again the following Sunday to sell liquor contrary to
law, and no warrant could be served upon him on Sunday. While there
is some authority to the contrary, that the sale of liquor on Sunday without a license is not a breach of the peace: Commonwealth v. DePuyter
16 Pa. C.C. 589 (1885), we are inclined to follow the decision of our
own court in Commonwealth v. Geibel, 45 Montg. 126 (1929)."
This reasoning should apply with equal force to the proprietor of a gambling
establishment.
The lower court decisions which are frequently cited for holding that not
all misdemeanors are included within the term "breach of the peace" were held
not to be in point by the court in the Magaro case, which cited Commonwealth v.
Geibel, 13 D. & C. 115 (1929), Montgomery County, Williams, P.J.:
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"But the Sunday violation authorities are not pertinent because in
every case it was not so much the doing of the act as the doing of it on
Sunday that was unlawful. Here the act itself is against the law-the day
being immaterial. . . It should be kept clearly in mind that whatever
tends to' disturb the public safety, quiet and decorum is a breach of the
peace .....
(Page 115.) (Italics supplied.)
"If immunity were guaranteed one (1) day in seven (7) to quiet
and peaceful bootleggers, i.e. bootleggers careful not to create a public
disturbance or commit treason or felony, the enforcement of prohibition
would be greatly hampered." (Page 116.)
At some variance with the opinion in Commonwealth v.- Fannasy, supra, is
Commonwealth v. Overton et al., 42 Pa. C.C. 446 (1914), Luzerne County, Strauss,
J., where the defendant was indicted for the offense of keeping a gaming house,
and a motion to quash was filed because the warrant was issued and served on
Sunday. The court overruled the motion saying that open violations of the law ought
to be supressed whenever they occur. The court held at page 447:
"It would be scandalous, officials and government itself would become a by-word and a laughing stock, if the criminal whose acts fall short
of apparent breach of the peace or felony could set at naught the mandate of positive legislation on the one day which, in deference to the religious beliefs and practices of a majority of the people, has been protected
by secular statutory authority as a day of rest, while on every other day
decent law observance is admittedly enforceable. Open and defiant violation of law challenges officials to a combat of force and to a manifestation
of police power. Persisted in, defiance brings about a clash, that is to say,
an actual breach of the peace. Public peace is broken just as certainly when
public authorities are compelled to display and apply force in defense of
the general welfare, as when an individual is compelled to use force in
self-defense. The inciting cause of such a breach is part of the breach itself, and when it exists, a warrant may be issued and served in accordance
with the express language of the Act of 1705. We have thus far referred
to open and notorious violation of the law. There is nothing on the face of
the transcript or of the indictment to give information concerning the exact facts of this case. Whether hidden and secret violations, as, for instance, within the four walls of what is apparently a dwelling house,
are subject to the same rules, we need not now consider. In some instances this question might involve the reasonableness of municipal ordinances under which police raids on disorderly houses are from time to time
undertaken.
"If at the trial it shall develop that a warrant was issued not for a
present and open, but for a past, and perhaps secret violation, a motion
in arrest of judgment in case of conviction will be available to protect the
defendant's rights. The one thing that should be clear is that the Commonwealth has not by the act of 1705 paralyzed its own agencies and enfranchised crime on Sunday to an extent that might enable criminalsto escape before a warrant could be sworn out on a working day." (Italics
supplied.)

SUNDAY SEARCH WARRANTS

In Commonwealth v. Glasgow, 21 Lehigh L.J. 80 (1944), it was held that
transporting cases of alcoholic liquor not bearing official seals of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board and also an unlicensed revolver on the person of the
defendant, constituted a breach of the peace which justified his arrest on Sunday.
In commenting on the Act of 1705, Section 4, President Judge Henninger of
Lehigh County stated at pages 85, 86:
"Breach of the peace has been variously defined. It seemis to have
one definition for the specific common law crime of breach of the peace
and another to determine whether any other crime comes within the
class designated breaches of the peace. Courts have wisely been loath
to make any classification of crimes in that respect for circumstances surrounding the commission of a crime may constitute it on one occasion a
breach of the peace and on another case simply a violation of that particular section of the Criminal Code.
"We have studied carefully the cases submitted by the District Attorney and by counsel for defendant and will make no attempt to reconcile
these cases. In almost every instance they are complicated by procedural
difficulties which make much of the language concerning breach of the
peace and the legality of arrest on Sunday more obiter dicta. Furthermore, the leading case of Com. v. Sherman, 15 D. & C. 4, is confusing
because the learned court seems to hold that portion of the Act of 1705,
which was later reenacted, a dead letter law while adhering strictly to the
portion forbidding arrests on Sunday."
"In Pennsylvania, however, breach of the peace, while not extended
to every misdemeanor (Com. v. Eyre, 1 S. & R. 346, 350) goes beyond
the matter of violence alone. It has been held to include all violations of
the public peace, order or decorum, the disturbance of the public peace or
tranquility; 9 C. j. 386. So an act tending to corrupt public morals has
been held to be a*breach of the peace: Com. v. Sharpless, et al., 2 S. &
R. 91, 101. Licentiousness, when tending to corrupt society, is a breach
of the peace: Updegraph v. Com. 11 S. & R. 393, 408. Any violation of
public decorum is a breach of the peace: Lentz v. Raum, 21 Dist. 1116,
1117." (Page 87)
"It is inconceivable that in public view on a public highway a violator of the law may, taking advantage of a law designed to protect a holy
day, desecrate the Sabbath with impunity, by engaging in illicit traffic,
perhaps choosing that day because of a supposed immunity.... We do say
that his acts constitute a flagrant violation of public order and decorum,
disturb the public peace and tranquility and that if the police were helpless in the matter it would tend to encourage vigilantism and a resort to
violence and would become a threat to good order." (Page 88)
Whether an assault and battery is such a breach of the peace within the meaning of the Sunday law of 1705 as to permit the lodging of an information and the
making of an arrest on Sunday was the question in Commonwealth v. Johns, 64
D. & C. 35 (1948). President Judge Braham of Lawrence County held that such
proceedings were lawful.
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In view of the foregoing authorities, it is believed that the possession, maintenance and setting up of slot machines and punch boards for gambling purposes
is a "breach of the peace." Such offenses violate the clear and expressed policy
of this Commonwealth. The maintenance and operation of gambling devices encourage the gambling habit with its inevitable loss of money to the individual
and frequent infliction of hardship upon the members of his family. The operation of slot machines for gambling purposes is a breach of the peace because it
tends to corrupt public morals and disturb domestic tranquility as well as the
decorum, peace and good order of the community. Consequently, the service and
cxecution of a search warrant on Sunday for the purpose of seizing gambling devices operated behind closed doors appears to be legally justified. When the
members of the Gen'eral Assembly enacted the Act of 1705 we believe they certainly had in mind the interpretation given the phrase "breach of the peace'' by
the English Parliament and the English courts prior to 1705.3 This conclusion is
fortified by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Williamson
v. United States, 207 U. S. 425 (1908) and Long v. Ansell, 293 U. S. 76 (1934),
which hold that the term "breach of the peace" includes all indictable offenses.
3 In 1705 William Penn was the Proprietary and Governor of the Province of Pennsylvania under the Charter granted to him by King Charles I of England, March 4, 1681. Section VI thereof
gave Penn and his officers power to make "wholesome ordinances . . . for the preservation of
the peace, as for the better government of the people" so far as such ordinances should not be
contrary to the laws of England. Section VII of the Charter provided that a duplicate of all laws
enacted in Pennsylvania should be forwarded to the Privy Council in England, which could declare them void if deemed inconsistent with English law.

